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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States locks up more of its citizens than any other country in the
world, and incarceration rates are steadily rising.' In fact, the per-capita
incarceration rate in the United States is the highest in the world, vastly
2
outnumbering all other countries. But the United States did not always favor
retribution in the form of incarceration.' Indeed, throughout most of the twentieth
century, the criminal justice system's primary goal was rehabilitation. Federal
judges maintained wide discretion for criminal sentencing, and the availability of
indeterminate sentences promoted "individualized rehabilitation-oriented
sentences."" While this indeterminate sentencing scheme allowed the Board of
Parole to determine a criminal's actual incarceration time, it was largely
criticized for creating unpredictable and arbitrary sentencing outcomes.
A sentencing reform movement that swept the nation during the 1970s-
ultimately culminating with the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA) -
dramatically changed the federal sentencing landscape.! Described by many
1. THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008 5 (2008) [hereinafter
PEW CENTER REPORT].
2. See id. at 5, 35 (reporting that the U.S. incarcerates 750 of every 100,000 residents, compared to just
148 in England and Wales and 93 in Germany).
3. See James R. Dillon, Doubting Demaree: The Application of Ex Post Facto Principles to the United
States Sentencing Guidelines after United States v. Booker, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 1033, 1038-45 (2008)
(discussing the use of individualized sentencing focused on rehabilitation); Nora V. Demleitner, Good Conduct
Time: How Much and for Whom? The Unprincipled Approach of the Model Penal Code Sentencing, 61 FLA. L.
REV. 777, 777-78 (2009) (arguing that indeterminate sentencing based on rehabilitation dominated sentencing
prior to 1970).
4. Dillon, supra note 3, at 1038; Demleitner, supra note 3, at 777-78.
5. Dillon, supra note 3, at 1038 (quoting Douglas A. Berman, Conceptualizing Booker, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
387, 389 (2006)).
6. Id. at 1039.
7. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, sec. 212(a), § 3624, 98 Stat. 1837
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3624 (2006)).
8. See Eva S. Nilsen, Decency, Dignity, and Desert: Restoring Ideals of Humane Punishment to
Constitutional Discourse, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 111, 117-20 (2007) (arguing that the sentencing reform
movement has "fueled ever longer and harsher sentences."); Dillon, supra note 3, at 1040-42 (discussing the
impact of the SRA and the Sentencing Guidelines); Demleitner, supra note 3, at 778 (arguing that federal
sentencing law changes since 1970 have dramatically increased prison populations largely because their goals
are incapacitation and retribution).
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scholars as a reaction to the unpredictability of indeterminate sentencing
schemes, the rising crime rates during the 1960s, and the war on drugs, the SRA
established the United States Sentencing Commission (Commission) in an effort
to constrain federal courts and judicial discretion in sentencing through the use of
mandatory sentencing guidelines.9 The Commission ultimately promulgated the
Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) in 1987, which, until recently, acted as a
mandatory guide for federal judges when sentencing.'o Although the Guidelines
have generated great debate concerning all aspects of federal sentencing law, this
Comment addresses one small aspect of the federal sentencing debate: the
Bureau of Prisons' (Bureau) calculation of good time credits.
The SRA spawned a new federal "good time" system which, as the name
suggests, is a system that allows prisoners to reduce their incarceration time for
"exemplary compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations."" As part of
the SRA, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3624, which developed a new method to
calculate federal prisoners' good time credits by establishing a maximum
uniform rate of fifty-four days per year of possible good time credits that
prisoners could receive." The interpretation of § 3624(b)(1), which remains in
effect today, creates the controversy that forms the bulk of this Comment. 3
Although the statute appears to mandate a maximum flat rate of fifty-four
days per year of good time credits available to federal prisoners, the Bureau
interprets the statute to calculate good time credits based on time served rather
than sentence imposed.14 This effectively reduces the maximum days per year of
good time credits available to federal prisoners from fifty-four days to forty-
seven." Over the last few years, several prisoners have unsuccessfully challenged
the Bureau's interpretation of the statute.' 6 However, the time served versus
sentence imposed debate recently reached the Supreme Court in Barber v.
9. Dillon, supra note 3, at 1040-41; see Nilsen, supra note 8, at 117-20 (describing the cultural
background of sentencing reform).
10. Dillon, supra note 3, at 1040-41. The Guidelines are now advisory after the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 266 (2005). Dillion, supra note 3, at 1034.
I1. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (2006); Demleitner, supra note 3, at 784.
12. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, sec. 212(a), § 3624, 98 Stat. 1837
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3624 (2006)); Brief for the Respondent at 4, Barber v. Thomas, 130 S.Ct.
2499 (2010) (No. 09-5201) (filed January 14, 2010) [hereinafter Respondent's Brief].
13. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1) (2006).
14. Respondent's Brief, supra note 12, at 6; Demleitner, supra note 3, at 785.
15. Denleitner, supra note 3, at 785. Under the sentence imposed methodology, fifty-four days of the
year count towards good credit leaving only 311 days actually served. Id. On a ten-year sentence, that would
result in 540 days of good credit. Id. Under the time served methodology, the inmate serves 365 days (an entire
year) in order to earn the fifty-four days good credit. Id. Over a ten-year sentence, this method only results in
470 days good credit. Id.
16. See, e.g., Tablada v. Thomas, 533 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding the Bureau's methodology for
calculating good time credits was reasonable); Pacheco-Camacho v. Hood, 272 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 2001)
(ruling that the Bureau's calculation of good time credits based on time served was reasonable).
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Thomas."
This Comment addresses the federal good time credit debate and offers a
discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in Barber v. Thomas. Surprisingly,
this case appears to have slipped through the cracks of the sentencing debate, as
the issue involves a complicated mathematical formula promulgated by the
Bureau to calculate federal good time." As of the date of this Comment, not
much has been written on the issue. Yet, this case has enormously far-reaching
consequences, not only for model prisoners and the prison system at large, but
for the ordinary tax payer as well.'9 Indeed, Justice Kennedy's description of the
Court's decision in Barber speaks volumes on the issue: "[I]f the only way to call
attention to the human implications of this case is to speak in terms of
economics, then it should be noted that the Court's interpretation comes at a cost
to the taxpayers of untold millions of dollars." 20 Accordingly, this complicated
case has serious economic and social implications for millions of taxpayers, and
thus represents an important decision within the vast sentencing debate that is
ripe for considerable discussion.
Part II provides a brief history of federal sentencing by discussing the major
developments in sentencing law and explaining the development of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3624-the good time credits statute. Part III examines several circuit court
decisions in which federal prisoners have unsuccessfully challenged the Bureau's
calculation of good time credits prior to Barber v. Thomas. Part IV sets forth a
thorough analysis of Barber, detailing of the arguments made by each party and
critiquing the Supreme Court's ultimate decision to uphold the Bureau's
interpretation of § 3624 based on time served." Part V argues that the rules of
intra-statutory consistency and lenity undermine the Bureau's interpretation of
the good time credits statute, and suggests that the Court gave short shrift to these
two contentions of Barber's petitioners. Finally, Part VI discusses the
unfortunate social, economic, and racial implications of the Court's decision to
uphold the Bureau's interpretation.
Although good time credits represent only one small part of federal
sentencing policy, the Supreme Court's ruling in Barber v. Thomas ignores the
fundamental situation on the ground: the United States cannot maintain an
expanding rate of incarceration.22 Increasing model prisoner time only burdens
taxpayers and the prison system, and makes it more difficult for prisoners to
rehabilitate and get on with their lives.23
17. Barber v. Thomas, 130 S. Ct. 2499 (2010); Pacheco-Camacho, 272 F.3d at 2500; Transcript of Oral
Argument at I1, Barber v. Thomas, No. 09-5201 (argued March 30, 2010) [hereinafter Oral Argument].
18. See Barber, 129 S. CL at 2502-03 (discussing the Bureau's complicated formula).
19. See infra Part VI (discussing the decisions social and economic impact).
20. Barber, 129 S. CL at 2499 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 2511.
22. PEW CENTER REPORT, supra note 1, at 5.
23. See infra Part VI.B (discussing the economic impact of incarceration).
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II. THE HISTORY OF U.S. FEDERAL SENTENCING
"Up until the 1970s, indeterminate sentencing dominated sentencing in the
United States."24 Indeed, sentencing followed a traditional "'medical' model in
which criminal offenders were viewed primarily as patients in need of care and
rehabilitation by the penal system."25 As one scholar noted, "[t]his model
emphasized the rehabilitation of criminals, rather than punishment for or
deterrence of crime, as the primary purpose of the penal system, and called upon
sentencing judges and parole officials 'to craft individualized, rehabilitation-
oriented sentences 'almost like a doctor or social worker exercising clinical
judgment.' 2 6  As a result, sentencing judges enjoyed wide discretion in
sentencing, and indeterminate sentences placed "the ultimate authority to
determine the actual amount of time that a defendant would remain incarcerated
with the Board of Parole."2 7
A. The Sentencing Reform Act
Over the last forty years, the United States has witnessed a massive reform in
federal sentencing. 28 Because the public viewed indeterminate sentencing as
unequal and ineffective, lawmakers pushed for reform in the shape of
determinate sentencing schemes.2 9 This sentencing reform movement ultimately
gave rise to the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) of 1984.30
[The SRA] expressly abandoned the goal of prisoner rehabilitation as a
primary purpose of incarceration and established the United States
24. Demleitner, supra note 3, at 777; Dillon, supra note 3, at 1038.
25. Dillon, supra note 3, at 1038.
26. Id. (quoting Douglas A. Berman, Conceptualizing Booker, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 387, 389 (2006)).
27. Id. at 1038-39.
28. See id. at 1038-45 (discussing major developments in sentencing law beginning with the SRA);
Demleitner, supra note 3, at 777-78 (discussing the change in sentencing goals and the rise of prison
populations since the 1960s); Nilsen, supra note 8, at 117-18 (arguing that changing policies have led to
"increasingly severe sentences").
29. Dillon, supra note 3, at 1039-42.
30. Id. at 1040. "Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) as Title H of the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984." Brief of Petitioners at 4, Barber v. Thomas, 130 S. Ct. 2499 (2010) (No. 09-5201)
(argued March 30, 2010) [hereinafter Petitioners' Brief].
The fundamental innovation of the SRA was the authorization of sentencing guidelines that would
provide a sentencing range for every offense punishable by more than six months incarceration. The
SRA directed the Sentencing Commission to create sentencing ranges, leaving to the Commission
whether the guidelines would be "in the form of a series of grids, charts, formulas, or other
appropriate devices, or perhaps a combination of such devices." Pursuant to congressional
delegation, the Commission created a Sentencing Table that provides a sentencing range at the
intersection of a horizontal axis for the criminal history and a vertical axis for the seriousness of the
offense.
Id. at 5 (citations omitted).
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Sentencing Commission for the purpose of promulgating a set of binding
guidelines that would constrain the federal courts' sentencing discretion
into a much narrower range of permissible sentences.3
Following the SRA, the Commission promulgated the Guidelines,32 a rigid
sentencing table that severely restricted judicial discretion by setting a "narrow
sentencing range for each offender based on the offender's 'Criminal History
Category' and the 'Offense Level' of the offense, subject to various
",33
adjustments ....
The Guidelines quickly generated widespread criticism from many who
believed it overly constrained judicial discretion and "imposed penalties that
were disproportionate to the offense."34 Many scholars argue that the sentencing
reform movement in general, the SRA specifically, and the "politicization of
crime, have contributed to a dramatic build-up in the federal prison population"
as the penal system's primary goal of rehabilitation has taken a back seat to
"retribution and incapacitation."" Indeed, many scholars and judges believe that
"the Guidelines result in extreme sentences that may or may not be related to the
defendant's culpability." In particular, "the Guidelines ensure 'equal nonsense
for all,"' and "they provide a means of confining intuitive and nonrational
sentencing decisions to one decision-making body and then appl[ies] those
decisions equally to all criminal defendants."" As a result, "they also create an
illusion of rationality and, consequently, legitimacy." While the present state of
the federal prison system (and the philosophical and ethical considerations of
punishment) deserves serious attention, this Comment addresses only one issue
that occurred as a direct result of the SRA: good time credits under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3624.39
31. Dillon, supra note 3, at 1040.
32. Id. at 1040-41 (noting the first edition of the Guidelines went into effect in 1987).
33. Id. at 1041.
34. Id. at 1041-42.
35. Demleitner, supra note 3, at 777-78; see also Nilsen, supra note 8, at 116-18 (asserting that
determinate sentencing schemes, mandatory minimums, and sentencing guidelines have led to a seven-fold
increase in the U.S. prison population since 1970).
36. Danielle DeMasi Chattin, Note, The More You Gain, The More You Lose: Sentencing Insider
Trading Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 79 FORDHAM L. REv. 165, 187 (2010).
37. Rebecca Krauss, Comment, Neuroscience and Institutional Choice in Federal Sentencing Law, 120
YALE L.J. 367, 375 (2010).
38. Id.
39. Congress enacted 18 U.S.C § 3624(b) in 1984. Tablada v. Thomas, 533 F.3d 800, 803 (9th Cir.
2008); Petitioners' Brief, supra note 30, at 4-5; Respondent's Brief, supra note 12, at 4.
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B. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b): Good Time Credits
Broadly speaking, good time credits refer to time earned through
"compli[ance] with prison rules and regulations."" Typically, prisoners
participate in drug rehabilitation or education programs, earning good time
credits that are then deducted from a prisoner's sentence. 4' Good time credits can
substantially reduce prisoners' sentences and are considered valuable to
inmates.42
When Congress enacted the SRA in 1984, it replaced the existing good time
credit statute, which "provided graduated credits available per month, deducted
'from the term of sentence,"' to be awarded "at different rates depending on the
length of a prisoner's sentence."43
With the enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b), Congress established a uniform
maximum rate of fifty-four days per year of possible good time credits." The
Bureau now determines good time credits by assessing whether the prisoner "has
displayed exemplary compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations," and
whether the prisoner "earned, or is making satisfactory progress toward earning,
a high school diploma or an equivalent degree."45 In addition, "credit for the last
year or portion of a year of the term of imprisonment shall be prorated and
credited within the last six weeks of the sentence." 4 6
Although § 3624(b)(1) specifically provides a maximum of fifty-four days
per year of possible good time credits, the actual effect of the Bureau's
calculation provides only a maximum of forty-seven days per year.47 This is
40. Demleitner, supra note 3, at 780.
41. See id. at 781 (stating that good time credit schemes exist at both the state and federal levels).
42. Id.
43. Respondent's Brief, supra note 12, at 4-5; compare 18 U.S.C. § 4161 (repealed 1984), with 18
U.S.C. § 3624(b) Petitioners' Brief, supra note 30, at 5.
44. 18 U.S.C. 3624(b)(1) (2006).
[A] prisoner who is serving a term of imprisonment of more than 1 year other than a term of
imprisonment for the duration of the prisoners life, may receive credit toward the service of the
prisoner's sentence, beyond time served, of up to fifty-four days at the end of each year of the
prisoner's term of imprisonment, beginning at the end of the first year of the term, subject to
determination by the Bureau of Prisons that, during that year, the prisoner has displayed exemplary
compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations.
Id.; Petitioners' Brief, supra note 30, at 5; Respondent's Brief, supra note 12, at 5.
45. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1). Prisoners sentenced after 1996 can only achieve the maximum days per year
if they have earned or are progressing towards earning a high school diploma or its equivalent, but if this is not
the case then those prisoners are only eligible for a maximum of forty-two days per year. Demleitner, supra
note 3, at 784.
46. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1).
47. Tablada v. Thomas, 533 F.3d 800, 803-04 (9th Cir. 2008); Demleitner, supra note 3, at 785. The
Bureau's calculation applied to a ten year prison sentence awards a maximum of 470 days of good time credits
to "exceptional" prisoners, though the plain language of the statute states that fifty-four days per year is
available to "exceptional" prisoners, which would amount to 540 days over a ten year sentence. Petitioners'
Brief, supra note 30, at 11. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1)(2008) (designating "up to 54 days at the end of each
879
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because the Bureau calculates good time credits based on time served, rather than
sentence imposed.48 In fact, for over twenty-one years the Bureau has calculated
good time credits based on the time actually served instead of the sentence
imposed.49 In 1985, between enactment of the SRA and the official effective date
of § 3624(b),so "members of the Bureau's Office of General Counsel and
Regional Counsel Offices met to discuss the effect of the SRA on the calculation
of good time," where "they concluded that, 'in light of the statutory changes
made by the SRA,' good time credit once the SRA became effective should be
based 'upon the amount of time an inmate had served, not upon the sentence
imposed."'"
Since that decision, the Bureau has reaffirmed its methodology for
calculating good time credits in a 1988 internal memorandum, and in 1992 the
Bureau issued Program Statement 5880.28, which officially set out the
complicated formula now used to calculate good time credits based on time
served, rather than sentence imposed.52 Additionally, in 1997, the Bureau issued
an interim regulation, which asserted that good time credits should be calculated
based on time served.5 ' The Bureau's method for calculating good time credit is
currently codified in 28 C.F.R. § 523.20,- effective since December 5, 2005."
III. SENTENCE IMPOSED OR TIME SERVED: CHALLENGES
PRIOR TO BARBER V. THOMAS
Over the last decade, several federal prisoners have unsuccessfully
challenged the Bureau's interpretation, arguing that section 3624(b) requires that
good time credits be calculated based on the sentence imposed.16
year of the prisoner's term of imprisonment").
48. Tablada, 533 F.3d at 803-04; Petitioners' Brief, supra note 30, at 10-11; Respondent's Brief, supra
note 12, at 5-7; Demleitner, supra note 3, at 785.
49. Tablada, 533 F.3d at 803; Respondent's Brief, supra note 12, at 6.
50. Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3624 in 1984, Tablada, 533 F.3d at 803; Petitioners' Brief, supra note
30, at 4-5. The method for calculating "good time would not take effect until November 1, 1987, for offenses
committed after that date." Respondent's Brief, supra note 12, at 5.
51. Respondent's Brief, supra note 12, at 5 (emphasis added).
52. Tablada, 533 F.3d at 803-04; Petitioners' Brief, supra note 30, at 8-9.
53. Tablada, 533 F.3d at 803; Petitioners' Brief, supra note 30, at 9-10.
54. See 28 C.F.R. § 523.20(a) (2005).
For inmates serving a sentence for offenses committed on or after November 1, 1987, but before
September 13, 1994, the Bureau will award fifty-four days credit toward service of sentence (good
conduct time credit) for each year served. This amount is prorated when the time served by the
inmate for the sentence during the year is less than a full year.
Id.
55. Tablada, 533 F.3d at 803; Petitioners' Brief, supra note 30, at 10.
56. See Tablada, 533 F.3d at 802 ("In the petition, Tablada challenges the [Bureau's] calculation of
good time credits pursuant to the good time credit statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)."); Pacheco-Camacho v. Hood,
272 F.3d 1266, 1268 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Pacheco argues that this formula conflicts with the governing statute. In
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"One of the most disputed issues pertaining to federal good time is the way
in which the [Bureau] calculates it."" Indeed, because the Bureau "deducts good
time from the days actually served by the prisoner rather than the sentence
imposed by the judge, the maximum amount of good time per year is effectively
forty-seven days. Courts have deferred to the [Bureau's] calculation of good time
as [an] agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute."58
A. Ninth Circuit Challenges
1. Pacheco-Camacho v. Hood
In Pacheco-Camacho v. Hood, a federal prisoner challenged the Bureau's
calculation of good time credits, arguing that the phrase "term of imprisonment"
in § 3624(b)(1) refers to the sentence imposed by the judge. 9 Pacheco asserted
that the phrase "term of imprisonment" typically means penalty and sentence; as
such, the prisoner argued that the Bureau's interpretation of "term of
imprisonment" as "time served," instead of "sentence imposed," conflicted with
the plain language of § 3624(b)(1).6 The court disagreed.
The Ninth Circuit determined that the plain language of § 3624(b)(1) did not
point to whether "term of imprisonment" meant time served or sentence
imposed. Moreover, the court concluded that the legislative history shed little
light on this ambiguity." Finding the "meaning of 'term of imprisonment' as used
in § 3624(b) to be ambiguous," the court proceeded to examine whether the
Bureau's interpretation should be entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc.4
his view, when the statute awards fifty-four days 'at the end of each year of the prisoner's term of
imprisonment,' this award should be based on the sentence imposed, without regard to the time actually
served.").
57. Demleitner, supra note 3, at 785.
58. Id.
59. Pacheco-Camacho, 272 F.3d at 1268. See also 18 U.S.C. 3624(b)(1) ("[A] prisoner who is serving a
term of imprisonment of more than 1 year other than a term of imprisonment for the duration of the prisoners
life, may receive credit toward the service of the prisoner's sentence, beyond the time served, of up to fifty-four
days at the end of each year of the prisoner's term of imprisonment. . . .") (emphasis added).
60. Pacheco-Camacho, 272 F.3d at 1268.
61. Id. at 1271.
62. Id. at 1268.
63. Id. at 1269-70.
64. Id. at 1270; Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Under
Chevron, courts will defer to Congress' expressed intent when examining an interpretation of a statute that is in
dispute. Id. at 842-43. If the intent of Congress is unclear, rendering the statute ambiguous, then the court will
defer to an agency's interpretation of the statute as long as it "is based on a permissible construction of the
statute." Id. at 843.
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Following the analysis from Chevron, the court determined that the Bureau
retained implied authority from Congress to award good time credits.6 ' Because
interpretation of the phrase "term of imprisonment" fell within the implied
authority given to the Bureau by Congress, the only remaining question under
Chevron was whether the Bureau's interpretation was reasonable.6 The court
concluded that it was and declared, "even when viewed in the light most
favorable to Pacheco, the meaning of the statutory language of § 3624(b) is at
best ambiguous, and therefore we must defer to the reasonable interpretation
adopted by the [Bureau]."
2. Tablada v. Thomas
Eight years later, in Tablada v. Thomas, a federal prisoner sought a writ of
habeas corpus challenging the Bureau's interpretation of § 3624(b)(1).6 1 Unlike
Pacheco-Camacho, Tablada argued that when the Bureau promulgated its method
for calculating good time credits, it "failed to articulate a rational basis for its
interpretation" of § 3624(b)(1), embodied in 28 C.F.R. § 523.20 and Program
Statement 5880.28, thus abusing its discretion under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).69
Interestingly, the Bureau conceded this issue for § 523.20, but not for Program
Statement 5880.28.70
In determining a remedy, the Ninth Circuit explained that even after
invalidating § 523.20, the Bureau still acted reasonably in calculating good time
credits based on time served under Program Statement 5880.28.7 The court
refused, however, to accord Program Statement 5880.28 Chevron deference.72
Rather, the court asserted that 5880.28 was "an internal agency guideline, 'akin
to an interpretive rule"' that was "entitled to a measure of deference under
65. Pacheco-Camacho, 272 F.3d at 1270.
66. Id. at 1270-71.
67. Id. at 1271.
68. Tablada v. Thomas, 533 F.3d 800, 802 (9th Cir. 2008).
69. Id. at 802, 804; The Administrative Procedural Act (APA) states:
To the extent necessary to [a] decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all
relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the
meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall .. . (2) hold
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be. . . (A) arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
70. Tablada, 533 F.3d at 805.
71. Id. at 806.
72. Id. According to the Court, Chevron deference is only applicable to an agency's rules that are issued
"within the ambit of the authority entrusted to it by Congress," and that "[s]uch rules are characteristically
promulgated only after notice and comment." Id. (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27
(2001)). Accordingly, since Program Statement 5880.28 did "not purport to carry the force of law and was not
adopted after notice and comment," it could not be accorded Chevron deference. Id.
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Skidmore."" "Applying the factors articulated in Skidmore,"74 the court
concluded that "the methodology utilized in Program Statement 5880.28 [was]
both persuasive and reasonable."" Thus, the court affirmed the Bureau's
76interpretation.
B. National Challenges
Over the last ten years, several other circuit courts have heard challenges to
the Bureau's interpretation of § 3624(b)( 1).77 Three district courts determined that
§ 3624(b)(1) unambiguously obligated the Bureau to afford the maximum of
fifty-four days per year of good time credit based on the sentence imposed by the
judge.8 Each of these cases distinguished Pacheco-Camacho." Many appellate
courts rejected the Bureau's interpretation that § 3624(b) unambiguously calls for
a maximum of forty-seven days a year based on time served.o Two courts
interpreted "term of imprisonment" to mean time served."' Three other courts
ruled that "term of imprisonment" was ambiguous but determined the rule of
lenity 2 did not apply." After many lower courts split on the issue, the Supreme
Court finally granted certiorari.
73. Id. Under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), the Court noted that, "[tihe weight of such
a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade, if lacking power to control." Id. at 140.
74. The court considered the "'interpretation's thoroughness, rational validity, consistency with prior
and subsequent pronouncements,' the 'logic and expertness' of an agency decision, the care used in reaching the
decision, as well as the formality of the process used."' Tablada, 533 F.3d at 806 (quoting Wilderness Soc'y v.
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d 1051, 1068 (9th Cir. 2003)).
75. Id. at 806.
76. Id. at 809. Tablada's habeas petition was denied. Id.
77. See Petitioners' Brief, supra note 30, at 14 (citing Wright v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 451 F.3d 1231
(10th Cir. 2006); Sash v. Zank, 428 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2005), rehearing denied, 439 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2006);
Perez-Olivo v. Chavez 394 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2005); Moreland v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 363 F.Supp.2d 882,
894 (S.D. Tex. 2005), rev'd, 431 F.3d 180 (5th Cir. 2005); Bernitt v. Martinez, 432 F.3d 868 (8th Cir. 2005)
(per curium); Brown v. McFadden, 416 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curium); Yi. v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,
412 F.3d 526 (4th Cir. 2005); O'Donald v. Johns, 402 F.3d 172 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curium); Williams v.
Dewalt, 351 F. Supp. 2d 412 (D. Md. 2004), vacated, 2005 WL 4705074 (D. Md. Dec. 22, 2005); White v.
Scibana, 314 F. Supp. 2d 834 (W.D. Wis. 2004), rev'd, 390 F.3d 997 (7th Cir. 2004); Brown v. Hemingway,
No. 02-1948, 2002 WL 31845147 (6th Cir. Dec. 16, 2002); Williams v. Lamanna, No. 01-3198, 2001 WL
1136069 (6th Cir. Sept. 19, 2001)).
78. Moreland, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 894; Dewalt, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 420; Scibana, 314 F. Supp. 2d at 841;
Petitioners' Brief, supra note 30, at 14.
79. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 30, at 14.
80. Id.
81. Moreland, 431 F.3d at 181-82; Lamanna, 2001 WL 1136069, at *1; Petitioners' Brief, supra note
30, at 14.
82. Warren Thomas, Lenity on Me: LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka Points the Way Toward Defining
Authorization and Solving The Split Over The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 379, 393
(2011) (citation omitted) (The rule of lenity "requires courts to limit the reach of criminal statutes ... and
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IV. BARBER V. THOMAS
In Barber v. Thomas, the Supreme Court confronted the Bureau's
interpretation of § 3624(b)(1) and its calculation of good time credits based on
time served." Specifically, the Court answered the key question of whether "term
of imprisonment" in 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1) requires the Bureau to calculate
good time credits based on the judge imposed sentence or the time actually
served by a prisoner, ultimately siding with the Bureau's interpretation." The
petitioners included Barber and Jihad-Black, two federal prisoners convicted of
various weapons and drug offenses, both of whom filed petitions for writs of
habeas corpus challenging the Bureau's calculation of their good time credits.
The district court denied both habeas petitions, relying largely on the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Tablada v. Thomas.7
To understand the importance of what was at stake, consider how
interpreting the phrase "term of imprisonment" to mean time served or sentence
imposed affects the petitioners' time in prison. Barber is currently serving a
sentence of 320 months for weapons possession and drug trafficking." Under the
Bureau's calculation, Barber will receive a maximum of 1254 days of good time
credits, giving him a scheduled release date of March 29, 2016.9 However,
should the Bureau calculate Barber's good time credits based on the sentence
imposed, he would receive a maximum of 1440 days, resulting in 186 fewer days
in custody." If the Bureau calculated his good time credits based on sentence
imposed, he would be released on September 22, 2015.9'
Similarly, Jihad-Black is currently serving a 262-month sentence for felony
gun possession. 92 The Bureau calculated that he could receive a maximum of
construe any ambiguity against the government. The rule ensures that defendants have notice of what conduct
may subject them to criminal liability.").
83. Wright, 451 F.3d at 1236; Sash, 428 F.3d at 134; Perez-Olivo, 394 F.3d at 49; Petitioners' Brief,
supra note 30, at 14-15.
84. Barber v. Thomas, 130 S. Ct. 2499 (2010); Petitioners' Brief, supra note 30, at i; Respondent's
Brief, supra note 12, at i; Oral Argument, supra note 17, at 3-25.
85. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 30, at i; Respondent's Brief, supra note 12, at i.
86. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 30, at ii, 1; Respondent's Brief, supra note 12, at 2. The petitioners'
assert that the phrase "term of imprisonment" unambiguously means sentence imposed rather than time served.
Petitioners' Brief, supra note 30, at 17.
87. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 30, at 1. The Ninth Circuit consolidated the "petitioner's cases with
Talbada for purposes of filing a petition for writ of certiorari." Id. Tablada submitted his petition for writ of
certiorari on June 16, 2009, while the consolidated petition of Barber and Jihad-Black was "filed on July 8,
2009, and granted on November 30, 2009." Id. at 1-2.
88. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 30, at 11.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. Calculation based on the fact that September 22, 2015 is 186 days before Barber's scheduled
release date of March 29, 2016. Id.
92. Id.
884
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 42
1027 days of good time credit, suggesting a possible release date of May 21,
2016." If Jihad-Black's good time credits were calculated based on the sentence
imposed, he could receive a maximum of 1179 days, resulting in 152 fewer days
in custody.94 If the Bureau calculated his good time credits based on sentence
imposed, he would be released on December 21, 2015."
A. The Opposing Viewpoints: Arguments for Sentence Imposed and Time Served
1. Understanding the Petitioners: Calculating Good Time Credits Based on
the Sentence Imposed
The petitioners' strongest argument was rooted in the basic rules of statutory
construction." Essentially, petitioners claimed the phrase "'term of
imprisonment' unambiguously means the sentence imposed, not time actually
served." 7 Accordingly, "the repeated use of 'term of imprisonment' in
congressionally adopted descriptions of the judicial power to order incarceration
implicates the rule that 'statutory definitions control the meaning of statutory
words."' 9 Thus, when Congress and the Guidelines provided that a guilty
prisoner "may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment," the phrase "term of
imprisonment" logically translated to the actual sentence imposed by the court.9
In addition, the petitioners pointed to the judicial proceeding itself, asserting
that the commonly understood meaning of the phrase "term of imprisonment" is
the sentence imposed.'" Consider, for instance, that "Barber's judge ordered that
the defendant was committed to the custody of the [Bureau] for 'a term of 320
months imprisonment."" 0' Indeed, when a judge hands down a sentence,
everyone in the courtroom "hear[s] the judge impose the imprisonment for a term
of months, making the sentence imposed the ordinary and natural meaning of
'term of imprisonment."'1 02 Thus, the petitioners' relied on the lay understanding
of "term of imprisonment" to support their view.
Next, the petitioners invoked the rule of intra-statutory consistency.os Under
this rule, when a word or phrase is used repeatedly in a statute, the word or
93. Id.
94. Id. at 12.
95. Id. Calculation based on the fact that December 21, 2015 is 152 days before than Jihad-Black's
scheduled release date of May 21, 2016. Id. at 11.
96. Id. at 17-19.
97. Id. at 17.
98. Id. at 22 (quoting Burgess v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1572, 1577 (2008)).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 22-23.
102. Id. at 23.
103. Id.
885
2011 /Barber v. Thomas
phrase retains the same meaning throughout.'0 Section 3624(b)(1) provides the
phrase "term of imprisonment" three different times in the opening sentence."'
Notably, the Bureau interprets the first two uses of "term of imprisonment" to
mean sentence imposed; however, the Bureau interprets the third use of the
phrase in the same sentence to mean time actually served, in clear defiance of the
statute's plain language and the rule of intra-statutory consistency.'" As the
petitioners pointed out, "[t]he third use in the same sentence should have the
same meaning because the presumption favoring intra-statutory consistency is 'at
its most vigorous when a term is repeated within a given sentence."
The petitioners also examined legislative history, declaring that since 1867,
"Congress has consistently credited good time against the sentence imposed." 0 8
The petitioners cited to "'Congress's long history of using an inmate's sentence
to calculate good conduct time" to support their conclusion, and pointed out that
"Congress would have been more explicit if it had intended to adopt a different
policy.'"' The petitioners also noted that throughout the SRA, "term of
imprisonment" is used to mean the sentence imposed."o Moreover, when
Congress enacted § 3624(b), it stated a "'need for change from 'the complexity
of current law' and the need to award good time credit at an 'easily determined
rate.' Congress believed [§] 3624(b) to be 'considerably less complicated.""' In
fact, even before the enactment of § 3624(b)(1), Congress expressed a clear
104. Id. (citing Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990)).
105. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1). "[A] prisoner who is serving a term of imprisonment of more than 1 year
other than a term of imprisonment for the duration of a prisoner's life, may receive credit toward the service of
the prisoner's sentence, beyond the time served, of up to fifty-four days at the end of each year of the prisoner's
term of imprisonment . . . ." Id. "The [Bureau] unequivocally allows for good time credit on a sentence-or
term of imprisonment-of a year and a day. The [Bureau's] Program Statement provides, '[tlhe very shortest
sentence that can be awarded . .. is a sentence of I year and I day.' To the same effect, the second use refers to
a 'term of imprisonment' for life, which again can only mean the sentence imposed." Petitioners' Brief, supra
note 30, at 24 (citation omitted).
106. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 30, at 17. In their opening brief, the petitioners stated:
The [Bureau] agrees that the phrase means the sentence imposed in its first appearance, as it must
also in the second appearance. Because the rule of intra-statutory consistency is at its strongest when
dealing with the use of the same phrase in the same sentence, "term of imprisonment" must mean the
same thing when used the third time to set the standard against which fifty-four days of good time
credits are awarded. The BOP's claim that "term of imprisonment" means time served, but only in
one of its appearances in that sentence, contradicts the canon of construction that statutes generally
do not use the same words to mean different things.
Id.
107. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 30, at 24 (quoting Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994)).
108. Id. at 29.
109. Id. at 31 (quoting White v. Scibana, 314 F. Supp. 2d 834, 840 (W.D. Wis. 2004)).
110. Id. at 33 ("Before enactment, between enactment and effective date, and after the Guidelines were
effective, statements of legislative purpose reflect Congress's intention and working assumption that good time
credits were to be awarded against the sentence imposed.").
111. Id. at 31-32 (quoting S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 146-47 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
3329-30).
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intent for prisoners to serve eighty-five percent of the sentence imposed." 2
Congress likely found this calculation relevant considering that § 3624(b)(1) calls
for fifty-four days of good time credits per year, which happens to be fifteen
percent of one year."
Lastly, the petitioners claimed that even if the Court found the language,
context, and history of the statute ambiguous, the rule of lenity should still
apply." 4 Under this rule, any ambiguity of § 3624(b)(1) should be interpreted in
the light most favorable to the petitioners."' The petitioners asserted that this
interpretation trumped the majority of courts that have ignored the rule of lenity
in deference to the Bureau under Chevron and Skidmore."'6 Moreover, the
petitioners noted that the Bureau actually admitted that it failed to articulate a
rational basis for calculating "good time credit based on an interpretation
different from that formulated by the Sentencing Commission," in clear violation
of section 706(2)(A) of the APA."'7 Thus, they argued, the Bureau's interpretation
should be set aside as "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law.""'
2. Understanding the Bureau: Calculating Good Time Credits Based on
Time Served
The Bureau began by explaining that the "statute's requirements of annual
calculation, good conduct and educational progress, and proration" in the last
year of the sentence "indicate[d] that credit should be awarded on the basis of
time served by each prisoner.""9 Under this theory, "term of imprisonment" must
mean time actually served, since § 3624(b)(1) authorizes prisoners to receive
good time credits "'at the end of the first year of the term,' and thereafter 'at the
end of each year."' 20 Thus, the "method of determination requires the passage of
112. See id. at 29-36 (describing the history of the eighty-five percent calculation).
113. Id. at 33-34 ("The 85 percent rule is based simply on the fact that fifty-four days is approximately
15 percent (14.8 percent) of the 365 days . . . . In an earlier draft of the good time statute, the proposed
amount ... would have been up to 36 days. . . 'or approximately 10 percent' . . . . The final version simply
added 5 percent to the maximum available good time credits.").
114. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 30, at 37.
115. Thomas, supra note 82, at 393.
116. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 30, at 42. The petitioners also argued that Chevron deference is
improper because the Bureau "never received an express delegation from Congress to legislate in this area." Id.
at 20. Petitioners' claim that the Sentencing Commission did receive express delegation from the SRA, and thus
any deviation from the Commissions eighty-five percent rule (fifty-four days based on sentence imposed) would
be unreasonable under Chevron. Id. at 20. Even if deference were appropriate, the Bureau's violation of § 706
of the APA should void any Chevron deference under general rules of administrative law. Id.
117. Id. at 55.
118. Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(A)(2)). The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument in Tablada v. Thomas,
533 F.3d 800, 809 (9th Cir. 2008).
119. Respondent's Brief, supra note 12, at 12.
120. Id. at 18 (citing Moreland v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 431 F.3d 180, 186 (5th Cir. 2005)).
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time, as the prisoner serves his 'term of imprisonment,' and permits the prisoner
to earn good time credit only in annual increments.""2
Additionally, the Bureau stated that every appellate court that has considered
the petitioners' assertion of intra-statutory consistency concluded that the rule "is
of no assistance here, because the statute does not use the phrase 'term of
imprisonment' consistently." 22 In terms of legislative history, the Bureau noted
that, "[o]ne of the purposes of the SRA was to reverse" the default rule that
"good time credit was a prospective entitlement rather than a retrospective
award," and instead the SRA sought "to require prisoners to earn credit during
their incarceration."I 23 As the Bureau views it, the "[p]etitioners' position would
improperly roll back the clock to the pre-1987 era." 24
Even if the statute was found to be ambiguous, the Bureau argued that its
interpretation resolves any ambiguity. 12 Since Congress charged the Bureau
"with [the] responsibility for prison administration generally and the computation
of good time credit specifically," the Court should defer to its reasonable
interpretation of § 3624(b)(1).126 To the Bureau's credit, the majority of lower
courts deferred to the Bureau's interpretation and found that the rule of lenity
does not displace the Bureau's interpretive authority.127
Lastly, in response to the petitioners' assertion that the Bureau's
interpretation is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with the law," 28 the Bureau noted that the Ninth Circuit considered
this issue and still upheld the Bureau's interpretation.129
121. Id. A prisoner would therefore gain good time credits based on the time he or she is actually
serving.
122. Id. at 23. "Section 3624(b)(1)'s final sentence ... states that 'credit for the last year or portion of a
year of the term of imprisonment shall be prorated and credited within the last six weeks of the sentence.'
Context here indicates that 'term of imprisonment' means time served." Id. at 24.
123. Id. at 30.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 13.
126. Id. at 13, 37-51. Respondents cite dozens of cases supporting this argument. Id.
127. Id. at 37-51; Oral Argument, supra note 17, at 47-48. See also Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 242
(2001) (deferring to the Bureau's interpretation of statutes dealing with prisoner time credits); Reno v. Koray,
515 U.S. 50, 60-61 (1995) (deferring to the Bureau's interpretation of statutes dealing with prisoner time
credits). The main debate concerning the applicability of the rule of lenity is that it only applies to penal statutes
that punish, that § 3624(b) is a reward (non-penal), and thus the rule of lenity does not apply. Respondent's
Brief, supra note I1, at 41-42. See supra Part HI.A. One wonders if many of the courts deferred to the Bureau's
interpretation as an easy solution to a complicated problem.
128. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 30, at 55.
129. Respondent's Brief, supra note 12, at 49-50.
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B. The Supreme Court's Decision
To the dismay of over 200,000 federal prisoners, and at a cost of "untold
millions of dollars" of taxpayer money,3 o the Supreme Court, in a six-to-three
decision, agreed with the Bureau."' In doing so, it ruled that the Bureau's
interpretation of the statute-based on sentence imposed-reflected "the most
natural reading of the statutory language" and was "most consistent with [the
statute's] purpose". 3 2 The Court rejected the petitioners' arguments,'33 explaining
that it felt uncomfortable with the idea that model prisoners would receive good
time credits for time not actually served in prison.134
As the Court pointed out, under the petitioners' interpretation, a prisoner
sentenced to ten years would receive fifty-four days a year for each of his or her
sentence (540 days).'3 As a result, and assuming the prisoner received maximum
credits for exemplary behavior, the prisoner would be released after only eight
and a half years.'3 6 The Court expressed concern that the Bureau would then be
unable to "determine whether the prisoner had behaved in an exemplary fashion
'during [Year 10],'" as the statute requires.3 7
By discussing the competing interpretations through the use of the
hypothetical ten year sentence, the Court noted that the petitioners' view could
not be reconciled with the basic intent of the statute: the Bureau should calculate
good time credits for each prisoner "at the end of each year" a prisoner serves,
and should also determine if a prisoner behaved in an exemplary fashion "during
that year."" Under the petitioners' interpretation, "[t]he good time calculation
for Year 10 would not be made 'at the end of Year 10," and the Bureau would
similarly be unable to "determine whether the prisoner had behaved in exemplary
fashion 'during that year.'"'" The Court explained, "[w]e cannot say that this
language ('at the end of,' 'during that year') found its way into the statute by
accident."'" Thus, the Court concluded that the Bureau's interpretation, which
130. Barber v. Thomas, 130 S. Ct. 2499, 2511-12 (2010) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 2511.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 2502-06. It should be noted that the Court agreed with the Bureau's arguments laid out in
Part UI.1B.2, supra.
134. Barber, 130 S. Ct. at 2504.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. Yet, this fear seems unfounded, considering the fact that prisoners would not serve the last year
and a half of their sentence precisely because they behaved in an exemplary fashion during their total time
incarcerated and were thus released as a result of their model behavior.
138. Id. at 2504 (emphasis original).
139. Id. (emphasis original).
140. Id. (emphasis original).
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effectively prorates good time credits for each year the prisoner actually serves,
comported with the actual intent of Congress.141
The Court also concluded that the Bureau's interpretation furthers the
objective of § 3624 "because "[i]t ties the award of good time credits directly to
good behavior during the preceding year of imprisonment." 4 2 The Court noted
that the petitioners' interpretation, "insofar as it would award up to fifty-four
days per year of time sentenced as opposed to time served, allows a prisoner to
earn credit for both the portion of his sentence that he serves and the portion of
his sentence that he offset with earned good time credit." 43 The Court reasoned
that the petitioners were really asking the Bureau to "award good time credit not
only for the days a prisoner spends in prison and behaves appropriately, but also
for the days that he will not spend in prison at all, such as Year 10 in our
example."'" According to the Court, this would "loosen[] the statute's connection
between good behavior and the award of good time and transform[] the nature of
the exception to the basic sentence-imposed-is-sentenced-served rule," which "is
inconsistent with the statute's basic purpose."145
Concerning the petitioners' intra-statutory consistency argument, the Court
noted that "[t]he problem for petitioners, however, is that this presumption is not
absolute," and that "it yields readily to indications that the same phrase used in
different parts of the same statute means different things, particularly where the
phrase is one that speakers can easily use in different ways without risk of
confusion." 46 The Court concluded that indeed, "[t]he phrase 'term of
imprisonment' is just such a phrase," and that because "the statute uses the same
phrase 'term of imprisonment' in two different ways, the presumption" could not
help the petitioners.147
Additionally, the Court rejected both the petitioners' reliance on legislative
history and statements by the Commission, noting there was no indication that
the Commission had ever considered the precise question at issue.' 48 Finally,
although the Court did admit that the statute could be "construed as imposing a
criminal penalty," thus invoking the rule of lenity, the Court concluded that after
its decision, "there remains [no] 'grievous ambiguity or uncertainty' in the
141. Id. at 2511.
142. Id. at 2505.
143. Id. (emphasis original).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 2505-06.
146. Id. at 2506. Does it not seem that there was, for a long time before this decision, considerable
confusion as to how the term should be interpreted?
147. Id.
148. Id. at 2508 ("Again, however, we can find no indication that the Commission, in writing its
Supplementary Report or in the Guidelines themselves, considered or referred to the particular question here
before us, that is whether good time credits is to be based on time served or the sentence imposed.").
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statutory provision . . . ."149 Thus, the rule of lenity could not help the
petitioners.
V. INTRA-STATUTORY CONSISTENCY AND THE RULE OF LENITY SHOULD TRUMP
THE BUREAU'S INTERPRETATION
By all accounts, the Bureau's method for calculating good time credits based
on time served "contains cumbersome and confusing formulas 'that even the
Bureau describes as 'arithmetically complicated,' and which few, if any,
prisoners could ever be expected to decipher.""' In fact, during oral arguments
for Barber v. Thomas, the Supreme Court had trouble understanding the effect of
the statute under both interpretations.'52 Several of the Justices even appeared to
imply that the Bureau's method was less plausible and more confusing than the
petitioners' proposed method.15 The confusion generated by the Bureau's
calculation lends support to the argument that the rule of intra-statutory
consistency should apply. 5 4 Indeed, intra-statutory consistency, lenity, and
common sense should probably outweigh a method that takes 28 pages to present
and that even the Supreme Court had difficulty explaining.'"
A. Intra-statutory Consistency
Specifically, the Court gave short shrift to the petitioners' intra-statutory
consistency argument. It admitted, as the Bureau did, that the first two uses of the
phrase "term of imprisonment" in § 3624(b) actually mean sentence imposed.'6
The Court concluded, however, that the third use of the phrase "term of
imprisonment" in the same sentence had to mean "time actually served."' It did
so even recognizing the "presumption that a given term is used to mean the same
thing throughout a statute."' 8 Nonetheless, the Court explained that the
presumption "is not absolute," and that "[i]t yields readily to indications that the
149. Id. at 2508-09.
150. Id. at 2509.
151. Id. at 32 (quoting Moreland v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 363 F.Supp.2d 882, 894 (S.D. Tex. 2005)).
152. See Oral Argument, supra note 17, at 3-57. "[Congress] [p]robably ... didn't understand it because
it's an awfully hard statute to understand." Id. at 52 (quoting J. Roberts). "[I]f we consider both methods
plausible, the number comes out at 15 percent-85 percent. . . . It's a more workable number, and there are
some hints in the legislative history that Congress thought 85 percent, not 87.2 . . . [is] the easier number to
work with." Id. at 38-39 (quoting J. Ginsburg).
153. Id. at 52.
154. One word or phrase used three times in one sentence generally has one meaning. See supra text
accompanying notes 98-101.
155. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 30, at 10-11.
156. Id. at 24.
157. Barber, 130 S. Ct. at 2507-08.
158. Id. at 2506 (quoting Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994)).
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same phrase used in different parts of the same statute means different things,
particularly where the phrase is one that speakers can easily use in different ways
without risk of confusion."'"
While the Court makes a valid point, it completely misses the crux of the
petitioners' argument: while the presumption is not absolute, it is at its strongest
"when a term is repeated within a given sentence."'6 The Court, in doing away
with the presumption, references § 3624(d) where the phrase "term of
imprisonment" is clearly used to mean time actually served.'6 1 While it is true that
the statute uses term of imprisonment differently in other sections, the Court
overrules the intra-statutory consistency presumption by referencing a different
section of the statute, and ignores the bizarre inconsistency of its conclusion,
which allows two meanings of the phrase "term of imprisonment" in the same
sentence.162
This conclusion stands in clear defiance of the presumption that a word or
phrase used multiple times within the same sentence should be given the same
meaning."' Instead, the Court seems to disregard this rule and do away with its
logic by pointing out that different sections use the phrase "term of
imprisonment" differently, and thus giving it two different meanings within the
same sentence is not a problem.'6 The dissent aptly noted:
According to the Court, the phrase "term of imprisonment" must mean
"time actually served" the third time that it appears in this particular
subsection. But the Court gives the phrase a different interpretation the
first two times it is used in the very same sentence. This in itself
indicates that something is quite wrong here. 6 1
B. The Rule of Lenity
Additionally, the Court glossed over the petitioners' contention that the rule
of lenity should apply in this case because § 3624(b) is (1) ambiguous, (2)
subject to multiple interpretations, and (3) penal in nature, as it acts as a
punishment.'6 The rule of lenity applies when a statute is ambiguous and penal in
nature, and it "requires courts to limit the reach of criminal statutes . . . and
159. Id. (citation omitted).
160. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 30, at 24 (quoting Brown, 513 U.S. at 118).
161. Barber, 130 S. Ct. at 2506.
162. Id. at 2506-07.
163. Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994) ("Since there is a presumption that a given term is
used to mean the same thing throughout a statute, [the] presumption surely [is] at its most vigorous when a term
is repeated within a given sentence . . . .").
164. Barber, 130 S. Ct. at 2506-07.
165. Id. at 2512 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 2508-09 (majority); Petitioners' Brief, supra note 30, at 37.
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construe any ambiguity against the government." 6 7 In addition, "[t]he rule
ensures that defendants have notice of what conduct may subject them to
criminal liability."'" The Supreme Court has noted that "[tihe simple existence of
some statutory ambiguity . . . is not sufficient to warrant application of [the]
rule," and"[t]he rule of lenity applies only if, 'after seizing everything from
which aid can be derived,' . . . [the Court] can make 'no more than a guess as to
what Congress intended."" 6 9
First, the idea that § 3624(b) is "an administrative reward" that "sets forth
neither a criminal prohibition nor a criminal penalty"o7 0 seems contrary to
common sense when one considers that deference to the Bureau's method
subjects Barber to an additional six months of prison time,"' time that is harsh,
violent, and degrading. 172 Indeed, this additional time affects Barber's individual
liberty, especially because the initial sentence imposed was based on the idea that
prisoners would serve eighty-five percent of their sentence. 173 The Bureau's
interpretation requires Barber to serve 87.2 percent of the sentence imposed,
which is a punishment covered by the rule of lenity.174 Interestingly, the majority
even noted that § 3624 could "be construed as imposing a criminal penalty" on
prisoners, thus implicating the rule of lenity, though it rejected the petitioners'
use of the rule. 7 1
Second, if there has ever been a statute where the rule of lenity was
appropriate because of a "grievous ambiguity" in the statute, § 3624(b) surely
must be it.'76 Note that (1) the Ninth Circuit called the statute "at best
ambiguous,"' and (2) many lower courts split on the meaning of the statutory
phrase "term of imprisonment." 7 8 As such, the rule of lenity seems most
appropriate to deal with the ambiguity, as the rule of lenity has been described as
a "tiebreaker" that "resolves [a] circuit split."'7 9 Furthermore, the Court's
167. Thomas, supra note 82, at 393 (citation omitted).
168. Id.
169. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138-39 (1998) (quoting United States v. Wells, 519
U.S. 482, 499 (1997)).
170. Respondent's Brief, supra note 12, at 41-42.
171. Oral Argument, supra note 17, at 57.
172. See Nilsen, supra note 8, at 123 ("Today's prisoners enters a world marked by racial unrest, gang
warfare, and abusive guards.").
173. Oral Argument, supra note 17, at 57; Petitioners' Brief, supra note 30, at 30-37 ("Members of
Congress characterized the good time credit statute as granting a 15 percent reduction from the defendant's
sentence as imposed."); Demleitner, supra note 3, at 785 ("The guideline ranges are 15% longer than the time
Congress intended for prisoners to stay incarcerated. This meant... prisoners should serve . .. 85% of the
sentences imposed.").
174. Oral Argument, supra note 17, at 57.
175. Barber, 130 S. Ct. at 2509.
176. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138-39 (1994).
177. Pacheco-Camacho v. Hood, 272 F.3d 1266, 1271 (9th Cir. 2001).
178. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 30, at 14.
179. Pacheco-Camacho v. Hood, 272 F.3d 1266, 1271 (9th Cir. 2001); Thomas, supra note 82, at 400;
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interpretation means the phrase "term of imprisonment" has two different
meanings within the same sentence, a result that is hard to believe Congress
intended, especially when one considers that this interpretation adds almost a
year of prison time to the petitioners' sentence.8 o However, the Court explained
that after its ruling, there remained no "'grievous ambiguity or uncertainty' in the
statutory provision," and thus the rule could not help the petitioners."' It is hard
not to agree with the dissent when it stated: "the rule of lenity should tip the
balance in petitioners' favor. . . . We should not disadvantage almost 200,000
federal prisoners unless Congress clearly warned them they would face that harsh
result."'82
VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
No matter where one stands on the statute's ultimate meaning and
construction, there can be no doubt that the Supreme Court's decision will have
far-reaching implications, many of which appear to be disastrous for the
taxpayers, prisoners, and the prison system at large. Indeed, the petitioners in
Barber v. Thomas will spend an additional 338 combined days in prison as a
result of the Bureau's interpretation.' At least the dissent willingly recognized
that many prisoners are now subjected to more time in our troubled federal
prisons at the taxpayers' expense.'8 As Justice Kennedy stated:
The Court has interpreted a federal sentencing statute in a manner that
disadvantages almost 200,000 federal prisoners. . . . Absent a clear
congressional directive, the statute ought not to be read as the Court
reads it. For the Court's interpretation-an interpretation that in my
submission is quite incorrect-imposes tens of thousands of years of
additional prison time on federal prisoners according to a mathematical
formula they will be unable to understand. And if the only way to call
attention to the human implications of this case is to speak in terms of
economics, then it should be noted that the Court's interpretation comes
at a cost to the taxpayers of untold millions of dollars. The interpretation
the Court adopts, moreover, will be devastating to the prisoners who
have behaved the best and will undermine the purpose of the statute.
Petitioners' Brief, supra note 30, at 14; see supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
180. See supra discussion accompanying notes 88-95.
181. Barber, 130 S. Ct. at 2509.
182. Id. at 2515-16 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
183. See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
184. Barber v. Thomas, 130 S. Ct. at 2512 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
185. Id.
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Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's ruling will continue to perpetuate a
system that ignores the idea of rehabilitation at an enormous cost to taxpayers, all
while having a disproportionately harsh effect on model prisoners and the racial
minorities that make up the majority of our prison system.186
A. Prison Population and Prison Costs
The SRA and the subsequent Guidelines have vastly increased the number of
prisoners across the country. 87 In fact, "since the 1980s, federal inmate [prison]
populations have increased by more than 600%.""' As one scholar noted, "[a]t or
near the root of virtually every serious criticism of the guidelines is the concern
that they are too harsh, that federal law requires imposition of prison sentences
too often and for terms that are too long," and that "[i]ncarcerative sentences are
imposed far more often than they were before the guidelines, and the length of
imposed sentences has nearly tripled."' 9 Indeed, at a time when incarceration
rates are at an all-time high, the Supreme Court's decision will only place a
heavier burden on the prison system as prisoners remain incarcerated longer and
do not receive the good time credits they have earned.
The Barber v. Thomas decision alone has cost taxpayers more than $20,000,
as the average annual cost to house a prisoner is over $22,000 and the petitioners
will serve close to an extra year in federal prison.'9" To be sure, this decision will
only increase the strain on prison budgets, which are already wreaking havoc on
the financial stability of the federal budget and the country at large.191 Tax payers
will be footing the bill for this additional prison time during a period when "the
Unitied States spends approximately 60 billion annually on corrections." 92
Indeed, states are now spending four times more money on corrections than they
did in 1987.'93 By the end of year 2011, "continued prison growth is expected to
cost states an additional $25 billion."' 94 On average, states spend one out of every
186. See Nilsen, supra note 8, at 120 (more than sixty percent of prisoners are minorities).
187. Frank 0. Bowman, 111, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural Analysis,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1328-29 (2005).
188. Id. at 1329.
189. Id. at 1328.
190. See Adam M. Gershowitz, An Informational Approach to the Mass Imprisonment Problem, 40
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 47, 53 (2008) ("The cost of locking up an offender for a single year exceeds $22,000."); see
supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
191. See id. at 80-84 ("The drastic increase in imprisonment has had significant financial
consequences."); see also MICHAEL JACOBSON, DOWNSIZING PRISONS: How To REDUCE CRIME AND END
MASS INCARCERATION 8 (2005) ("Even with a slowly recovering national economy, states simply do not (and
will not) have the revenue to continue prison expansion while simultaneously supporting Medicaid, maintaining
low tax rates, and adequately funding education and health systems.").
192. Id. at 53.
193. See PEW CENTER REPORT, supra note 1, at 11 (reporting that States spent over $49 billion on
corrections in 2007, up from $12 billion in 1987).
194. Id.
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fifteen dollars from their discretionary budgets on corrections.'" Spending on
corrections has increased dramatically to the point that it now is increasing faster
than higher education spending, and five states actually spend more on
corrections than higher education.'
The enormous cost of state correctional spending would be "burdensome in
the most affluent of times, but in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, it has
become unsustainable." 97 Moreover, "between 1985 and 2008, national annual
correctional expenditures from general funds alone increased from $6.7 billion to
more than $47 billion dollars-an increase of 700 percent."'" If this statistic is
not alarming enough, "[c]orrections now consumes one of every fifteen state
general fund dollars, making it the second-fastest growing category of general
fund expenditures, outpaced only by the growing cost of Medicaid."'" As the
dissent in Barber recognized, the majority's decision will unnecessarily burden
the taxpayer with the cost of housing model prisoners,2 " which inevitably reduces
the amount of money that will be used for other needed programs.201
B. Rehabilitation and Incentives: Good Time Credits Should Be an Incentive to
Model Prisoners Rather than a Punishment
At a time when recidivism rates are "discouragingly high,"2 02 good time
credits should provide prisoners with an incentive to participate in drug
rehabilitation and educational programs. Studies suggest that "good time
programs can both enhance public safety and save costs."'20 Indeed, some
evidence suggests that as the length of a sentence increases, there is an increased
risk of recidivism, and that "'continued imprisonment . . . may actually increase
the risk for future recidivism."' 204 Extending prisoners' time in increasingly
violent and inhumane prisons in direct defiance of § 3624(b)(1)'s clear language
only hinders the effectiveness of good time programs and society's ability to
195. Id. at 14; Gershowitz, supra note 190, at 53 (2008); PEW CENTER REPORT, supra note 1, at 14.
196. PEW CENTER REPORT, supra note 1, at 15-16. These five states include Vermont, Michigan,
Oregon, Connecticut, and Deleware. Id. at 16.
197. Cecelia Klingele, Changing the Sentence Without Hiding the Truth: Judicial Sentence Modification
as a Promising Method of Early Release, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 465, 470 (2010) ("State correctional costs
are now estimated to exceed $50 billion annually.").
198. Id. at 482-83.
199. Id. at 483.
200. Barber, 130 S. Ct. at 2512, 2515-16 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
201. See PEW CENTER REPORT, supra note 1, at 15 ("Some policy makers are questioning the wisdom of
devoting an increasingly large slice of the budget pie to incarceration").
202. Id.
203. Demleitner, supra note 3, at 787.
204. Michael Vitiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1011, 1036 (1991) (low-risk
inmates who are imprisoned may actually be at an increased risk for future recidivism).
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cope with the increasing number of incarcerated individuals who will inevitably
return to their communities.205
By increasing a prisoner's time, we further subject him or her to fear, "racial
unrest, gang warfare, and abusive guards."'
He will live with the ever-present risks of being assaulted, raped, or even
turned into a gang sex slave; contracting HIV, tuberculosis, or other
diseases; being put into isolated confinement, or twenty-three hour a day
lockdown; and being thrown into a cell with a severely mentally
disturbed and potentially violent inmate. 207
Amazingly, the Bureau's interpretation punishes precisely those model
prisoners that it should be rewarding. The Bureau should calculate good time
credits based on sentence imposed precisely so model inmates who have taken
advantage of education and other minimal opportunities inside prisons are not
exposed to the realities of prison any longer than necessary. By reducing a model
prisoner's good time credits, the Bureau punishes precisely the inmates whom it
should reward by creating a disincentive for model prisoners to participate in
rehabilitative and transitional programs.
Interestingly, the majority in Barber v. Thomas even noted that § 3624 could
"be construed as imposing a criminal penalty" on prisoners, though it ultimately
rejected the petitioners' use of the rule of lenity. 208 At least Justice Kennedy
acknowledged the harsh results of the Court's decision-that many prisoners will
now be subjected to more time in our troubled federal prisons at taxpayer
expense. 20 He stated:
To a prisoner, time behind bars is not some theoretical or mathematical
concept. It is something real, even terrifying. Survival itself may be at
stake. To this time, the Court adds days-compounded to years. We
should not embrace this harsh result where Congress itself has not done
211
so in clear terms.
Aside from the consequences to taxpayers, the consequences for federal
prisoners are very real. Millions of prisoners, those who are behaving in an
exemplary fashion, will be subjected to continued time in harsh conditions.
Imagine the frustration prisoners must feel who live in an exemplary fashion, yet
205. Nilsen, supra note 8, at 117-22 ("[W]e turned to prisons to warehouse society's undesirables. The
combined effect of these developments has multiplied the U.S. prison population . . . from 300,000 in 1970 to
2.2 million in 2005.").
206. Id. at 123.
207. Id. at 123-224.
208. Barber, 130 S. Ct. at 2509.
209. Id. at 2512 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 2517 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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now realize that they may be serving considerably more prison time behind bars
than the statute requires based on the sentence imposed interpretation. The
Bureau's interpretation reduces incentives for prisoners who strive for the
maximum amount of good time credits.
C. Racial Disparity
The Court's decision also has a disproportionately harsh effect on minorities.
Indeed, the country's unique sentencing system, one that incarcerates more of its
citizens than anywhere else in the world, affects minorities on a momentous
scale.2" One scholar's statement appears highly relevant:
The Court's refusal to subject punishment to meaningful constitutional
scrutiny is matched by its refusal to consider clear cases of racial bias in
the criminal justice system. As we have seen, minorities are grossly
overrepresented throughout the criminal justice system, and it cannot be
explained by the fact that a higher percentage of minorities than whites
commit crime. But the Supreme Court has repeatedly ignored this
evidence by . . . find[ing] no constitutional infirmity in discriminatory
effect, only in intentional discrimination.212
Although the Bureau never intended to discriminate through its interpretation
of § 3624(b), the Court's decision further compounds the disparate impact racial
minorities face as a result of added prison time and our nation's sentencing
policies. For example, one commentator noted that in Washington D.C.,"75% of
black males can expect to go to prison or jail in their lifetime."213 Racial
minorities make up sixty percent of the general prison population, and "[n]early
one in eight black men between the ages of twenty and twenty-nine are in
prison." 214 For black males "finishing high school is the exception," and "prison
is almost routine." 215 Additionally, "Blacks and Latinos each comprise less than
15 percent of the U.S. population, but were 40 and 20 percent (respectively) of
the jail and prison population in 2008.""' Indeed, "[t]he 2008 imprisonment rate
for Latino men (1,200 per 100,000) was more than double that of white men (487
per 100,000), and the imprisonment rate for black men (3,161 per 100,000) was
six times higher than that of white men," while the "incarceration rate for Latino
women was one-and-a-half times that of white women (50 per 100,000), and
211. PEW CENTER REPORT, supra note 1, at 5-7; Nilsen, supra note 8, at 120.
212. Nilsen, supra note 8, at 155.
213. Id. at 118, 120-22 (almost seven percent of our population will go to prison).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 120-21 (citation omitted).
216. Naomi Murakawa & Katherine Beckett, The Penology of Racial Innocence: The Erasure of Racism
in the Study and Practice of Punishment, 44 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 695,699 (2010).
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black women's incarceration rate (149 per 100,000) was three times that of white
women.""' Although "racial disparities in incarceration rates have been fairly
constant over time, the ratio of black to white prison admissions increased from
2.1 in 1930 to 7.0 in 2000," and "[b]y 2004, nearly 60 percent of young black
men without a high school degree had spend time behind prison bars.""'
These statistics reflect the disparate impact sentencing policies have on
minority communities as well. "Disproportionate prison sentences of African
Americans and Latinos" that result from sentencing policies such as the disparity
between crack and powder cocaine "effectively punish many more individuals
than the convicted defendants."219 Indeed, these disproportionate sentences
"change the demographics and economy of inner city communities, leave
children without fathers, parents without sons, and women without men of
marriageable age." 220 Accordingly, the Supreme Court's ruling in Barber impacts
more than the minorities who will now serve longer prison sentences. By
increasing the time minorities will spend in our nation's federal prisons, families,
sons, daughters, wives, and minority communities at large will be forced to
endure even longer without their loved ones.
VII. CONCLUSION
The United States cannot continue to emasculate an entire class of citizens,
nor can it continue to support our current penal goal of retribution at the expense
of its tax revenue, prisoners, and citizens. Although the broader sentencing
reform debate remains outside the scope of this Comment, the Supreme Court's
decision in Barber v. Thomas ignores the simple fact that the United States
continues to incarcerate citizens at an alarming rate, spending taxpayer money
with little or no return on the investment.2 ' To be sure, studies suggest "that a
continual increase in our reliance on incarceration will pay declining dividends in
crime prevention. In short, experts say, expanding prisons will accomplish less
and cost more than it has in the past."222
Good time credits should act as an incentive for inmates to obtain an
education or learn a trade to improve their chance of successfully reintegrating
with the general population. 223 Assuring model prisoners the maximum rate of
217. Id.
218. Id. (citation omitted).
219. Nilsen, supra note 8, at 122-23.
220. Id. ("This occurs as a result of punishing those convicted of crack cocaine offenses with
significantly harsher sentences than those convicted of power cocaine offenses. Powder cocaine is more likely
to be used by white offenders, whereas crack cocaine is more closely identified with black offenders. Thus,
sentencing laws send a powerful and negative racial message.").
221. See PEW CENTER REPORT, supra note 1, at 21.
222. Id.
223. Demleitner, supra note 3, at 787 (noting these programs reduce recidivism rates and save money).
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forty-seven days of good time credit per year, which is in clear defiance of the
plain language of the statute, will only perpetuate disincentives for rehabilitation.
By calculating "term of imprisonment" based on time served, the Bureau and the
Supreme Court move the federal sentencing system further away from the
rehabilitation our prison system and those incarcerated desperately need.
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